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HOW SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS CAN
AND SHOULD BE USED TO ADVANCE ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE
DOUGLAS RUBIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Families living near coal plants in West Virginia are forced to
avoid contact with the tap water that flows into their house.' Their
water contains high concentrations of arsenic, barium, lead,
manganese and other chemicals that bum the skin, erode tooth enamel,
and may cause cancer. 2 This is exactly the sort of harm that the Clean
Water Act (the "CWA") is intended to prevent, and represents the type
of social tragedy that environmental justice ("EJ") advocates seek to
confront. For decades, underprivileged communities have fought to
resist the placement of power plants, landfills, and other environmental
hazards within their communities.3 However, these efforts have been
largely unsuccessful.4 This Comment provides guidance on how EJ
advocates may increase their chances of success by pursuing creative
environmental remedies rather than preventive measures. Specifically,
this Comment focuses on the use of Supplemental Environmental
Projects ("SEPs"), as facilitated by citizen suits brought under the
CWA.'
Through its citizen suit provision, the CWA empowers
community advocates to act on behalf of the United States ("U.S.") in
filing lawsuits against water polluters.6 However, remedies under the
CWA are limited to either injunctive relief, or other penalties that go
Copyright 0 2010 by Douglas Rubin.
* J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Maryland School of Law. B.A., University of Richmond.
1. Charles Duhigg, Clean Water Laws Are Neglected, at a Cost in Suffering, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/us/13water.html.
2. Id.
3. Julie H. Hurwitz & E. Quita Sullivan, Using Civil Rights Laws to Challenge
Environmental Racism: From Bean to Guardians to Chester to Sandoval, 2 J.L. Soc'Y 5, 10
(2001).
4. See infra Part II.B.
5. The CWA is noteworthy because until the mid-1980s it was the only statute that
allowed citizen to seek civil penalties. Moreover, a majority of environmental citizen suits
have historically been brought under the CWA. Charles S. Abell, Ignoring the Trees for the
Forests: How the Citizen Suit Provision of the Clean Water Act Violates the Constitution's
Separation of Powers Principle, 81 VA. L. REv. 1957, 1957 (1995).
6. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006).
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directly to the U.S. Department of the Treasury (the "Treasury").7
Fortunately, the Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA") has
created the SEP policy, which seeks to "encourage and obtain
environmental and public health protection that may not have
otherwise occurred." As an example, Merck & Co. agreed to a
Consent Decree in 2008 in response to a chemical discharge that
caused extensive fish kills in the Wissahickon Creek and disrupted the
Philadelphia Water Department's drinking water intake. 9 In addition
to paying $1,575,000 in penalties, Merck agreed to extensive SEPs,
which include creek restoration, wetland creation, as well as the
purchase and installation of comprehensive systems that monitor fish
activity as well as oxygen levels in the water.10 This constituted a
significant investment in the sustainability of this damaged
community.
To encourage polluters to engage in beneficial SEPs, the EPA
has set up an incentive scheme whereby the final settlement penalty
will be lower for a violator who agrees to perform an acceptable
SEP.' 1 In fact, if a SEP is properly implemented, "the citizen ...
achieves both prevention [through deterrence] and restoration, the
defendant pays a smaller penalty, and the environment benefits [as
well]." 2
However, there is substantial legal uncertainty as to how these
SEPs may be implemented. In establishing a SEP, community
advocates face numerous challenges on both constitutional 3 and
statutory grounds.14 These challenges perhaps explain why "fewer than
12% of settlements annually in cases involving penalties . .. used
SEPs" from 1992 to 2006.1s While these legal challenges have made
SEP implementation a somewhat unpredictable endeavor, the
advancement of SEPs would aid an EJ movement that is otherwise
struggling to find ways for the courts to help its cause.
7. Id
8. Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. 24796,
24796 (May 5, 1998) [hereinafter Final SEP Policy].
9. Press Release, Environmental Protection Agency, Merck Settles Clean Water Act
Violations Related to June 2006 Fish Kills in Wissahickon Creek (Dec. 13, 2007), available at
http://yosemitel.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/6427a6b7538955c585257359003f0230/fcfl 70d84
74c34db852573b0006806a8!OpenDocument& Start-5.4&Count-5& Expand=5.4.
10. Id.
I1. Final SEP Policy, supra note 8, at 24796.
12. Kenneth T. Kristl, Making a Good Idea Even Better: Rethinking the Limits on
Supplemental Environmental Projects, 31 VT. L. REV. 217, 218 (2007).
13. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part Ill.B.
15. Kristl, supra note 12, at 219.
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II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
MOVEMENT
A. Why Environmental Justice is Important
The EJ movement is a response to a collective concern that the
burdens of environmental hazards fall disproportionately on poor and
minority communities.16 While this concept predates the establishment
of the U.S. as a nation," the contemporary understanding of
environmental justice as a civil rights issue developed as a response to
the Warren County Protests in 1982.18 These protests concerned the
North Carolina Governor's decision to use Warren County as a
"dumping [ground] for more than 6,000 truckloads of soil
contaminated with toxic polychlorinated biphenyls."l 9  The
government's decision garnered particular attention because, at this
time, "Warren was the poorest county in the state, and the population
was over 65% black." 20 In response to perceived racism and attacks on
the health of Warren County neighborhoods, national civil rights and
environmental leaders joined forces with the community to launch a
massive protest that resulted in over 500 arrests.2' While these protests
were ultimately unsuccessful in changing the site for the landfill, the
events that transpired in Warren County are considered "the spark that
ignited the [EJ] movement." 22
These events prompted a spate of studies that confirmed a
moral crisis in the way that environmental hazards are managed in the
U.S. First, studies have demonstrated that the distribution of
environmental hazards is significantly related to racial breakdown. In
1983, a study by the General Accounting Office ("GAO") showed that
three out of four off-site landfills examined in southeastern states were
located in predominantly minority communities.23 A 1987 study by the
United Church of Christ corroborated these findings, as they identified
16. Jason Pinney, The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and Environmental
Justice: Do the National Environmental Policy Act and the Clean Air Act Offer a Better Way?,
30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 353, 355 (2003).
17. Hurwitz & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 10.
18. Id. at I1.
19. Pinney, supra note 16, at 356.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 357.
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that "race was the single most significant factor associated with the
location of licensed and abandoned hazardous waste facilities." 24
Moreover, race has also been shown to influence the manner in
which environmental laws are enforced. In 1992, the National Law
Journal exposed "glaring inequalities" in the way the EPA addressed
hazards and imposed penalties.25 According to that study, the EPA is
less likely to rosecute environmental violations that occur in minority
communities. * For those violations that are prosecuted within
minority communities, they will often result in relatively lenient
27
penalties. With all of this scholarly attention, the notion of EJ has
expanded to include not only the unequal distribution of environmental
burdens, but also the unequal enforcement of environmental laws.28
In the 1990s, EJ advocates received affirmation as the U.S.
government began to officially recognize their mission. First, the EPA
took initiative and formed the Office of Environmental Equity, which
set out to "develop and implement EJ initiatives."29 Later, while never
passed, several EJ bills were introduced in the House of
Representatives between 1992 and 1994.30 Ultimately, this display of
government interest culminated in Executive Order No. 12,898, signed
by President Clinton in 1994.31 This order requires that "each Federal
agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission
by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high
and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs,
policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income
populations in the United States."32 Following this Executive Order,
the EPA actually went beyond its obligations and formed the National
Environmental Justice Advisory Committee, the Office of
Environmental Justice, the Environmental Justice Steering Committee,
and the Office of Civil Rights. These government actions surely were
great symbolic victories for EJ advocates, but enforcing any EJ claims
in court has been a consistent challenge.
24. Id. at 358.
25. Id. at 359.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 360.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. I1, 1994).
33. Pinney, supra note 16, at 362.
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B. Why the Current Tools Being Usedfor Environmental Justice Are
Not Working
While the federal government has acknowledged the EJ
movement, neither Congress, the EPA, nor any President has taken
action that protected vulnerable communities in a way that could be
judicially enforced. This failure is partly explained by the chasm that
exists between traditional environmental goals and social justice
issues. 34 The environmental movement, both public and private, was
founded on a notion of conservation. 35 Conservationists emphasize
protecting certain resources and acting for the overall benefit of
humankind. 6 As a result, the concept of disproportionate burdens on
certain social groups has been viewed as an alien concept.37 Thus,
legal and regulatory schemes have been slow to respond to EJ issues,
resulting in what some have called an "antiurban bias."38
Since EJ issues have not been fully embraced by the
environmental movement, EJ advocates have taken their case to the
courts by asserting traditional civil rights actions. Proponents of EJ
have pursued litigation under numerous legal theories: through
enforcement of Clinton's Executive Order;39 by bringing claims under
the Equal Protection Clause;40 by bringing a claim under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act;41 and by bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.42 Unfortunately, since EJ claims usually stem from complaints
of disproportionate impact on certain groups, these legal tools have
been largely ineffective.
While President Clinton's Executive Order amounts to EJ
validation at the highest level of government, Executive Order No.
12,898 merely serves as a guiding document for government agencies.
Notably, the order's enforcement potential is restricted by section 609,
specifying that it "shall not be construed to create any right to judicial
review involving the compliance or noncompliance ... with this
order."43 As such, EJ advocates have attempted to use existing federal
laws to protect their communities from being disproportionately
34. EDWARDO LAO RHODES, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 31 (2003).
35. Id. at 30.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 31.
38. Id.
39. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
41. Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII (1964).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
43. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 § 609 (Feb. I1, 1994).
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impacted by environmental harms. However, EJ advocates have faced
substantial legal obstacles, as courts have interpreted these federal
laws very narrowly.
The first EJ cases were brought under the Equal Protection
Clause.44 Although this is an intuitive strategy for litigating
environmental harms that disproportionately impact minorities, the
Equal Protection Clause has become "one of the most disfavored
theories for [EJ] advocates to employ."45 The challenges associated
with this strategy were exemplified in Bean v. Southwestern Waste
Management,46 where despite powerful evidence of a pattern of solid
waste facilities being cited in communities of color throughout
Houston, Texas, the residents were unsuccessful in their legal claim
because they were unable to prove intent to discriminate. 7 Applying
the Supreme Court standard in Washington v. Davis,4 8 this holding
demonstrated that an EJ claim brought under the Equal Protection
clause will only be successful when the disproportionate impacts are
"unexplainable on grounds other than race." This has proven to be a
tremendous burden for advocates seeking to protect their communities,
as relief can only be granted in the event of overt acts of
50discrimination.
Litigants have also pursued EJ litigation under Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act.5 ' Section 601 of the Act prevents recipients of
federal funding from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or
national origin.52 However, like Equal Protection claims, courts will
not grant relief unless plaintiffs can prove discriminatory intent, which
imposes a "formidable burden for environmental justice plaintiffs."53
As a result, litigants turned to section 602 of the Act, which mandates
that agencies charged with distribution of federal funds abide by
section 601's anti-discrimination requirements.54 This course of action
was once promising, as there was a period of time where section 602
claims merely required a showing of disparate impact, not
44. Hurwitz & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 18.
45. Pinney, supra note 16, at 377.
46. 482 F. Supp. 673 (S. Dist. TX 1979).
47. Id. at 677.
48. 426 U.S. 229, 238 (1976) (holding that disparate impact alone does not constitute a
constitutional violation unless there was also an intent to discriminate).
49. Hurwitz & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 21.
50. Pinney, supra note 16, at 378.
51. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 2000d - 2000d-7 (2006).
52. Id. § 2000d. (note: do not use "at" see Rule 3.3)
53. Pinney, supra note 16, at 375.
54. Civil Rights Act, supra note 38, § 2000d-1.
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discriminatory intent.55 However, the Supreme Court in Alexander v.
Sandoval5 6 retreated from this position, declaring that private parties
do not have standing to sue under section 602.57 As a result, litigants
must again rely on section 601 for relief, which eliminates the use of
the Civil Rights Act for all but the most egregious cases of intentional
discrimination.58
Finally, while Sandoval clearly barred disparate impact claims
under Title VI against private organizations that receive federal funds,
the question remained open as to whether a disparate impact claim
could be brouht against a public recipient of federal funds under 42
U.S. § 1983.' Six federal courts60 have determined that "a federal
regulation has the force and effect of law," and may therefore
implicate section 1983.61 However, whether or not a regulation is
actionable under section 1983 depends on whether there is a private
right of action directly under that regulation. 62 Ironically, if federal law
or regulation provides a private right of action, the courts have
interpreted its existence as evidence of congressional intent to
foreclose a remedy under section 1983.63 As a result, this legal tool has
been severely limited by the courts as well.
Undoubtedly, Washington v. Davis and its progeny have made
it incredibly difficult to assert a claim based on disproportionate
impact, or "effect" alone. However, even before Washington,
disproportionate impact litigation has historically been ineffective. 64
While the "effects test" was rejected for constitutional claims, during
the period between 1974 and 2000, the Supreme Court nevertheless
adopted the effects test for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.65 However,
"[d]uring [that] twenty-seven-year ... period, not a single appellate
55. Pinney, supra note 16, at 375.
56. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
57. Id. at 293.
58. Pinney, supra note 16, at 376.
59. Adele P. Kimmel, et al. The Sandoval Decision and its Implications for Future Civil
Rights Enforcement, 76 FLA. B.J. 24, 27 (2002).
60. District of Columbia, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eleventh, and the Southern District of
New York. Hurwitz & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 42.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 44.
63. Id.
64. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 701, 705-06 (2006).
65. Charles F. Abernathy, Legal Realism and the Failure of the "Effects" Test for
Discrimination, 94 GEO. L.J. 267, 269 (2006).
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decision used the test as an independent source for righting racial
wrongs."66
Despite the exuberance of advocacy scholars around the
"effects doctrine" in the civil rights arena, there have always been
underlying implementation concerns that rendered it largely
ineffectual.67 Notably, the courts have necessarily employed a
"business necessity prong,"68 which required that judges make a
normative judgment as to whether there was a "sufficient
nondiscriminatory justification" to permit a challenged act. 69
Additionally, since courts lacked specific guidelines, "courts have
been quick to a rove common business practices despite their
disparate impact." The notion of proving intent to discriminate has
proven perhaps too challenging, and history provides no indication that
litigating disproportionate impact could be any more successful even if
Washington v. Davis were overturned.
III. WHY COMMUNITY ADVOCATES SHOULD EMBRACE SUPPLEMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS, AND WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW
The legal framework outlined above demonstrates that
communities have little power to prevent the government from making
environmental judgments that have a disparate impact on their
communities. Since the courts have struck down each strategy that EJ
advocates have used to prevent discrimination, political and economic
forces will continue to compel decision-makers to reinforce
environmental injustice.7' However, EJ advocates may find greater
success by taking a more reactive approach to harm inflicted on their
communities. Studies have indicated environmental violations are not
satisfactorily addressed in vulnerable communities, 72 So SEPs may be
extremely effective in promoting environmental justice. However, if
SEPs are to be effectively used going forward, it is important that EJ
advocates have a firm understanding of the legal issues involved in
SEP implementation. The major issues are: (A) the government may
66. Id. at 270.
67. Id. at 288.
68. Selmi, supra note 64, at 749.
69. Abernathy, supra note 65, at 284.
70. Selmi, supra note 64, at 753.
71. See R. Gregory Roberts, Environmental Justice and Community Empowerment:
Learning from the Civil Rights Movement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 229, 246-47 (1998) (identifying
political and economic powerlessness of minority and poor communities as the "central issue"
of environmental justice).
72. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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over-file and eliminate a citizen suit; (B) the Miscellaneous Receipts
Act has been interpreted to mandate that all penalties go to the
Treasury; and (C) the EPA has established and promulgated a SEP
policy that has become progressively more restrictive over time.
A. The Government May Over-file and Trump Any Citizen Suit
For historical perspective, it is important to note that prior to
1990, SEPs were used extensively through consent decrees despite the
fact that there were no statutory provisions that actually authorized
these projects. However, the Reagan White House, as well as the
Department of Justice ("DOJ"), expressed concern over the lack of
government oversight for these decrees.74 This led to the amendment
of section 505 of the CWA, which now requires that "[n]o consent
judgment shall be entered in an action in which the United States is not
a party prior to 45 days following the receipt of a copy of the proposed
consent judgment by the Attorney General and the Administrator."75
This amendment, which applies to all consent decrees generally, was
intended to allow the government "the opportunity to identify, to
challenge and to deter, as much as possible," problematic
settlements. 76 If during these forty-five days, any state agency
commences and "diligently prosecutes" the issue, no citizen suit could
be filed.77
The government's ability to "over-file" and trump a citizen suit
is particularly dangerous for citizen suits that may result in SEPs, as
government agencies have viewed these projects with skepticism. 78
Government agencies often choose to over-file in order to negotiate
their own settlements. In fact, for some states, "[p]reemption for the
sole purpose of removing citizen suits from a state's enforcement
73. Edward Lloyd, Supplemental Environmental Projects Have Been Effectively Used in
Citizen Suits to Deter Future Violations As Well As to Achieve Significant Additional
Environmental Benefits, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 413, 422 (2004).
74. Id.
75. Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006).
76. Id.
77. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6).
78. See Elizabeth R. Thagard, The Rule That Clean Water Act Civil Penalties Must Go
to the Treasury and How to Avoid It, 16 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 507, 528-29 (1992) (noting
that the Department of Justice has historically taken the stance that pure monetary penalties
are better than SEPs from a deterrence standpoint and that SEPs may promote inconsistent
treatment among polluters).
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arena has become more of a rule than an exception." 79 If states take
preemptive action to vigorously enforce environmental laws against
polluters, this is not a cause for concern. However, some states will
over-file citizen suits at the request of the polluter, and this state action
often results in lenient treatment of polluters.s0
A prime example of this counter-productive state action
involves suits brought by the "Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), one of the groups that began bringing CWA citizen suits in
the early 1980s."81 Since 1986, NRDC cases have been preempted by
states at least fifty times.82 In many cases, the state enforcement action,
whether judicial or administrative, resulted in lenient sanctions and
relief to local polluters who sought protection from NRDC's citizen
suit. 83 This type of preemption violates the purpose of the laws, fails to
protect the environment, and often precludes any opportunity for a
SEP to be implemented to aid a harmed community. This presents the
first major obstacle for an EJ advocate, and this problem arises even
before the citizen suit is filed.
Unfortunately, there is not a compelling strategy to avoid this
tactic. If a state is antagonistic towards environmental citizen suits, a
plaintiff may be best served by simply avoiding informing authorities
of the suit. For instance, an attorney may ask for a proposed order
rather than a consent decree that requires government notification.84
Otherwise, community groups will have to pressure their state through
the political process, or by threats to go to the media if the state
proceeds to over-file to the benefit of the polluter.
B. Most Courts Have Ruled that All Penalties Must go to the
Treasury
The Miscellaneous Receipts Act (the "MRA") states that "an
official or agent of the Government receiving money for the
Government from any source shall deposit the money in the Treasury
as soon as practicable without deduction for any charge or claim."
While this may not appear to dictate whether it is appropriate for a
79. David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal
System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority is Shared by the United
States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1648 (1995).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1648-49.
83. See id. at 1649.
84. See Thagard, supra note 78, at 531.
85. Miscellaneous Receipts Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (2006).
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polluter to implement an environmental project, this act has proven to
be a substantial obstacle for the implementation of SEPs. Whether
resulting from a citizen or government suit, civil penalties that result
from environmental infractions are considered "money for the
government" under the MRA. Despite the fact that money may be
directed towards an environmental project, these funds are considered
constructively "received" by the government for the purposes of the
MRA.8 Once money is directed to the Treasury, the money is likely
lost in terms of environmental or community recovery.
In each instance that federal appellate courts have ruled on this
issue, they have rigidly interpreted the MRA to require that all civil
penalties be directed to the Treasury. The Supreme Court, through
dicta, has touched on this issue in two cases, Gwaltney of Smithfield v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Middlesex County Sewerage
Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association.89 In both of these
cases, civil penalties are described as "payable to the government." 90
Lower appellate courts have rigidly followed this language; both the
Ninth and Third circuits have declared that all civil penalties must be
paid into the Treasury, to be used at the government's discretion.91
While this requirement may appear arbitrary and overly
burdensome, especially when the equitable impact of a SEP is
considered, the federal government has framed this as a separation-of-
powers issue. The DOJ has stated that a SEP is unlawful "if you had a
direct substitution of payments to . . . a third party entity ... in lieu of
payment to the Treasury." 92 For SEPs, this alleged "substitution of
86. Memorandum from John Peter Suarez, Assistant Administrator, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency on Guidance Concerning the Use of Third Parties in the Performance of
Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) and the Aggregation of SEP Funds to Regional
Counsels, Regional Enforcement Managers, Regional Media Division Directors, Regional
Enforcement Coordinators (Dec. 5, 2003), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/seps-thirdparties.pdf.
87. Id.
88. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
89. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
90. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 53; see also National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 14.
91. See Sierra Club v. Electronic Controls Design, 909 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990)
(declaring that a court cannot order a defendant in a citizens' suit to make payments to an
organization other than the U.S. Treasury); see also Public Interest Research Group of New
Jersey v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, 913 F.2d 64, 82 (3rd Cir. 1990) (holding that penalties in
citizen suits under the Act must be paid to the Treasury).
92. Environmental Credit Projects Under Clean Water Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlhfe Conservation and the Environment and the Subcomm. on
Oceanography of the Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 100th Cong. 25 (1988)
(testimony of Raymond Ludwiszewski, Associate Deputy Att'y General, U.S. Dept. of
Justice).
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payments" occurs when a court issues a civil penalty that is
subsequently diverted towards en environmental project rather than
going to the Treasury. The contention is that diverting money away
from the Treasury infringes on Congress' power to control the federal
purse, so this diversion of funds has been declared an improper
augmentation of the agency's appropriation. 93
The constitutional concerns implicated by the MRA may be
fatal to a proposed SEP. As such, it is critical that someone seeking to
implement a SEP fully understand the considerations of the courts, and
how best to proceed. As a preliminary step, the litigator on behalf of
the plaintiff communities should push defendants to agree to a SEP
prior to any finding of liability. If there is a finding of liability, the
community should seek equitable relief rather than any "penalty."
Finally, if the court insists on imposing a penalty, plaintiffs should
offer equitable and statutory arguments to justify a SEP.
1. The Benefit ofAvoiding "Liability"
Given that the aforementioned federal courts have declared that
civil penalties must go to the Treasury, proponents of SEPs should
seek to ensure that the relevant funds are never designated as a
"penalty." The most effective means to achieve this would be to
negotiate a consent decree that is settled before there is any finding of
liability. Without liability, there can be no penalty. If there is no
penalty, the proposed funding for the SEP is never "received" by the
government, and therefore the MRA is not implicated. This strategy
was encouraged b2 the Ninth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Electronic
Controls Design, where the court instructed that a lower court
enforce a consent decree that included a SEP on the grounds that it
was simply an out-of-court settlement negotiated prior to a finding of
liability. . This rule provides community advocates with substantial
freedom to negotiate settlements that would further EJ goals.
However, there will be times when civil or criminal liability is
established, and in that case the legal analysis becomes much more
complicated.
2. Challenges in Moving Forward with a SEP despite a
Finding ofLiability
If there is a finding of liability, a SEP proponent should argue
that the CWA grants the court substantial discretion when it comes to
93. Id.
94. 909 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990).
95. Id. at 1354.
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penalty allocation. If the court can be convinced that a civil penalty is
not necessary, then SEP advocates can simply propose a SEP through
a consent decree that would arguably be enforceable under Electronic
Controls.96 At least one court in Hawaii exercised such judicial
discretion97 based on its interpretation of section 1319(d) of the CWA,
which states that "any person who violates . .. this title . .. shall be
subject to a civil penalty" 98 While this language appears to mandate a
civil penalty upon the finding of CWA liability, the District Court of
Hawaii, in Hawaii's Thousand Friends, Life o Land, Inc. v. Honolulu,
declared that this language was ambiguous.9 While this case did not
involve a SEP, Hawaii's Thousand Friends provides persuasive
authority for the proposition that CWA penalty decisions should be left
to the discretion of the court. If the court can be convinced that a
penalty is not mandatory, a SEP has a much greater likelihood of
success.
However, it is important to note that most jurisdictions will
mandate a civil penalty if there is a finding of liability for a CWA
violation.i00 The Eleventh Circuit, in Atlantic States Legal Foundation
v. Tyson Foods, 0 I established that "once a violation has been
established, some form of penalty is required." 02 This mechanical
interpretation of the MRA is the most likely court reaction.103 So,
someone pushing for a SEP must know how to appropriately pursue
the issue further.
3. Is There Hope for SEPs After a Penalty is Issued?
If liability is established, and if a civil penalty is subsequently
granted, there is substantial legal authority indicating that it is
unlawful to use that penalty for a SEP. Notably, two federal appellate
courts have taken a very restrictive stance on this issue. The Ninth
Circuit, in Electronic Controls, asserted that "civil penalties .. . may
be paid only to the U.S. treasury."' 04 The Third Circuit, in Public
96. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
97. See generally Hawaii's Thousand Friends, Life of Land, Inc. v. City and County of
Honolulu, 149 F.R.D. 614 (D. Haw. 1993).
98. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2006).
99. Hawaii's Thousand Friends, 149 F.R.D. at 617 (noting that the statute uses the term
"shall be subject to" rather than "shall pay").
100. Thagard, supra note 78, at 522.
101. 897 F.2d 1128 (11th Cir. 1990).
102. Id. at 1142.
103. Thagard, supra note 78, at 522 (referring to the CWA committee report that stated
that penalties should go to the Treasury).
104. Sierra Club v. Electronic Controls Design, 909 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Interest Research Group v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, echoed the
Ninth Circuit's ruling, stating that "once the [trial] court labeled the
money as civil penalties it could only be paid into the Treasury." 05
A majority of courts have adopted this strict interpretation of
this rule. For example, in Atlantic States Legal Foundation v.
Universal Tool & Stamping,0 the court declared that "once there has
been a judicial finding of liability, a court has no choice but to impose
a civil penalty and civil penalties must be paid to the Treasury" . In
Friends of the Earth v. Archer Daniels Midland Co.,'"o this rigid rule
was applied despite a consent decree that was supported by both
parties. 09 Because the consent decree was negotiated after a finding of
liability, the court determined that it was required under the CWA to
impose a civil penalty that could only be paid to the U. S.'" Some
courts have specifically indicated that using penalty funds for SEPs
would be a preferable result, but that they were legally compelled to
direct all penalties to the Treasury. This sentiment was evident in USA
v. Smithfield Foods,"' where the court had originally directed that
some penalty money should go towards a SEP for bay restoration.112
However, at the prompting of the government, the court regretfully
ruled that all penalty money must go to the Treasury. 13
However, a few select cases provide hope for EJ advocates, as
some courts have managed to reserve for themselves more discretion
in handling civil penalties. In part, these courts have relied on
language in the CWA, which states that:
[i]n determining the amount of a civil penalty the court
shall consider the seriousness of the violation or
violations, the economic benefit (if any) resulting from
the violation, any history of such violations, any good-
faith efforts to comply with the applicable
requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on
105. 913 F.2d 64, 82 (3rd Cir. 1990).
106. 786 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. Ind. 1992).
107. Id. at 754.
108. 780 F. Supp. 95 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
109. Id. at 100-01.
110. Id.
11. 982 F. Supp. 373 (E. Dist. Va. 1997).
112. Id. at 376.
113. Id.
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the violator, and such other matters as justice may
' 14require.14
One example where the court applied a flexible penalty policy
was United States v. San Diego.' In that case, the court decided to
split civil penalties so that some money went to the Treasury, with
other funds going towards a SEP.1 6 In formulating this compromise,
the court considered various "matters as justice may require" in order
to fashion what it considered an equitable remedy." 7 In that case, the
federal government requested a penalty of $10 million to go to the
Treasury." 8 Meanwhile, the City of San Diego requested a mere $1.4
million in penalties, with $1 million being directed toward a SEP." 9 In
the end, the court decided on a $3 million penalty, with $2.5 million
going towards a SEP, and the other $500,000 going to the Treasury. 20
Though, the most vigorous defense of the court's discretion
came from an Oregon district court in Northwest Environmental
Defense Center v. Unified Sewerage Agency.121 In that case, the
federal government insisted that all penalty money should be directed
to the Treasury.122 However, the court rejected the government's
request, declaring that the "purpose of the Clean Water Act is to
improve water quality, not endow the Treasury." 23 Further, the court
contended diverting some penalty funds to a SEP was in full
conformity with the penalty provisions of the CWA.124 Not only was
the polluter punished through a mandate of costly injunctive relief, an
additional $1 million will fund "further enforcement by the state of
Oregon and improve water quality in the Tualatin River basin in ways
which could not be judicially mandated." 25 Moreover, the court
asserted that since none of the penalties went directly to the plaintiffs
or any organizations with which they are involved, this was a proper
result from a properly executed citizen suit. 126 Though rare, these cases
114. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006)(emphasis added).
115. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5459 (S. Dist. Cal. 1991).
116. Id. at 18.
117. Id. at 11.
118. Id.at 7.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 18.
121. 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13349 (Dist. Ct. Or. 1990).
122. Id. at 2.
123. Id. at 3.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2-3.
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serve as proof that SEPs can succeed even after a penalty has been
issued, despite the government's stance that all civil penalties must go
to the Treasury.
C. The Significance of Administrative SEP Policy
In addition to the courts, the EPA has also played a critical role
in shaping the use of SEPs. If the EPA brings a federal claim, or if the
EPA intervenes in a citizen suit, actions will be guided by the EPA's
SEP policy. 127 Most significantly for EJ and SEP advocates, the EPA's
SEP policy has dramatically evolved in two key areas: the amount that
a penalty may be mitigated by a SEP and the extent to which a SEP
must be related to the harm that was caused.
1. Diminishing Scope of the EPA's SEP Policy Over Time
In 1991, the EPA released its first SEP policy, which simply
set out to ensure that no one profits from his or her violation of the
law.128 A penalty was to be assessed "at a level which captures the
[defendant's] economic benefit of noncompliance plus some
appreciable portion of the gravity component of the penalty." 29 Then,
as long as there is a relationship between "the nature of the violation
and the environmental benefits to be derived,"l 30 a violator could use a
SEP to mitigate up to one hundred percent of their penalty.'31
Subsequent iterations of this rule significantly narrowed the
scope of allowable SEPs.132 First, the "nexus" consideration that
requires a relationship between the SEP and the environmental harm
became much more restrictive in subsequent policy refinements.
Unlike the standard in 1991, where the SEP simply had to be related to
"the nature of the violation," the 1995 Interim SEP Policy required that
the SEP be related to the violation itself.133 Additionally, the 1995
policy restricted the amount that SEPs could mitigate a penalty.134
Rather than mitigating up to one hundred percent of the penalty, the
127. See generally Final SEP Policy, supra note 8.
128. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Policy on the Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects in
EPA Settlements, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 35607 (Feb. 12, 1991).
129. Id. at 35607.
130. Id.
131. Id. at35610.
132. Kristl, supra note 12, at 324.
133. Interim Revised EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 60 Fed.
Reg. 24856, 24858 (May 10, 1995).
134. Id. at 24861.
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mitigation percentage was now capped at eighty percent.' 35 This meant
that for every dollar spent on a SEP, the offender's penalty might only
be reduced by up to eighty cents. In 1998, the EPA promulgated its
final SEP policy,' 36 which largely reinforced the restrictions that were
introduced in 1995.137 The Final SEP Policy, published in 1998,
affirmed the narrow nexus requirement from the 1995 policy, and
further retains the eighty percent cap on penalty mitigation from any
SEP.138
With these changes, the EPA has gradually limited the
effectiveness and the appeal of implementing SEPs. By departing from
their 1991 standard and mandating a tighter connection between the
SEP and the violation, it follows that "fewer options will be [available]
for acceptable SEPs."l 3 9 Additionally, the current cap on mitigation
provides a further disincentive for implementing SEPs. Now, in
accordance with the Final SEP Policy:
[A] defendant who spends $1 on a SEP can only get, at
best, an 80 reduction in its penalty. Thus, official EPA
policy requires a defendant who wants to perform a
SEP to pay more than the defendant would if it were
simply paying a penalty alone. This economic
disincentive likely creates a restraint on SEP
utilization.140
These two EPA-imposed restrictions on SEPs clearly have
resulted in reduced implementation of SEPs. This result is regrettable,
particularly since this policy is apparently justified by a connection
with the MRA (described below) that the EPA has never fully
explained.
2. EPA's Justification for SEP Restrictions
The EPA apparently justifies its restrictive SEP policies by
claiming that they are bound by the MRA. The EPA sought to explain
this connection in a 2002 SEP memo entitled, "Importance of the
135. Id.
136. Final SEP Policy, supra note 8.
137. Kristl, supra note 12, at 220.
138. Id. at 236-37.
139. Id. at 220.
140. Id.
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Nexus Requirement in the Supplemental Environmental Projects
Policy."I 4 1 The EPA has taken the stance that:
[a]n adequate nexus is important because it ensures that
the Agency complies with the SEP Policy and the
requirements of the MRA . . . . If there is a relationship
between the alleged violation and the SEP, then it is
within the Agency's discretion to take the SEP into
account as a mitigating factor when determining the
amount of a penalty that the Agency will agree to as
part of an overall settlement. If there is no nexus, then
the Agency does not have that discretion.142
However, despite the EPA's declaration that a nexus
requirement "ensures that the agency complies with the ...
requirements of the MRA,"14 3 the connection between these two
concepts is not altogether clear. In 1987, Raymond Ludwiscewski,
then Associate Deputy Attorney General of the DOJ, attempted to
explain this connection during a Congressional hearing. 144 In his
testimony, Mr. Ludwiscewski stated that a "substitution" of penalties
would be unlawful under the MRA, while "mitigation" for an act of
repentance would be permissible. 145 He suggested that an unlawful
"substitution" occurs when the Executive Branch decides that they will
direct penalties to some other action, rather than directing the penalties
to the Treasury.146 On the other hand, a permissible "mitigation" is
when the Attorney General reduces a penalty in response to the
demonstrated repentance of a violator. 47 So, "repentance" in the form
of a SEP would justify some penalty "mitigation," which is
141. Memorandum from Walker B. Smith, Director , U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency on the Importance of the Nexus Requirement in the Supplemental Environmental
Projects Policy to Regional Counsel, Regional Enforcement Division Directors, Regional
Media Division Directors (Oct. 31, 2002), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/sepnexus-mem.pdf [hereinafter
Smith Memorandum].
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Environmental Credit Projects Under Clean Water Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment and the Subcomm. on
Oceanography of the Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries H.R., 100th Cong. 20-33
(1988) (testimony of Raymond Ludwiszewski, Associate Deputy Att'y General, U.S. Dept. of
Justice).
145. Id. at 24.
146. Id.
147. Id at 26.
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permissible under the MRA so long as money is not technically being
"diverted" from the Treasury.148 With this ambiguous standard in
place, the viability of a SEP ultimately depends on prosecutorial
discretion, since the government decides whether a SEP constitutes an
unlawful "substitution" or a permissible "mitigation."1 49 This legal
ambiguity certainly has chilled the use of SEPs.
Moreover, the EPA has provided SEP advocates with little
guidance on how to craft an acceptable SEP. In a 2002 memo that
describes challenges associated with meeting the "nexus" requirement
specifically, 50 the EPA encouraged SEP advocates to call the agency
for clarification and guidance on a case-by-case basis.' 5' Lacking a
sense of predictability, polluters are now more likely to either "play it
safe" and elect projects that have been approved before, or simply
avoid SEPs altogether.' 5 2 This conservative SEP implementation
harms the EJ movement in particular, which demands a more flexible
approach to SEPs so that they can be used for creative community-
building solutions.
IV. CONCLUSIONS: CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW, AND SUGGESTIONS
Given the challenges facing the EJ movement, SEPs may
provide a valuable tool to encourage polluters to help harmed
communities in the wake of a CWA violation.'53 Unfortunately, the
courts have interpreted the CWA and the MRA in such a way that SEP
implementation can be a real challenge.154 One important lesson is that
SEP advocates are well-served to attempt to settle their citizen suit
before there is a finding of liabilit .'55 Once there is liability, most
courts will require a civil penalty.1 6 Most courts that require a civil
penalty will also require that the entire amount be directed to the
Treasury. ' Thus, in most cases, a finding of liability is a death-knell
for a desirable SEP that could help vulnerable communities.
148. Id.
149. Kristl, supra note 12, at 249-50.
150. Smith Memorandum, supra note 141.
151. See Smith Memorandum, supra note 141, at 2.
152. Kristl, supra note 12, at 241.
153. See supra Section III.
154. See supra Section II. B.
155. See supra Section III.B. L
156. See supra Section Ill.B.2.
157. See supra Section III.B.3.
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However, there are a few district courts that have enforced
SEPs in addition to imposing a penalty.158  Although scholarly
authorities have not come to a consensus on the legal merits of these
cases,159 these cases provide compelling, persuasive authority on
which advocates can rely in order to push for a robust EJ agenda
through SEPs. These cases serve as proof that the language of the
CWA may be interpreted to bestow substantial discretion upon the
courts with regards to the allocation of civil penalties.160 As such,
community advocates must echo the judges in these cases in order to
convince a court that SEPs are not only legal, but that this remedy
meets the purpose of the CWA and satisfies an important equitable
purpose.
Meanwhile, the EPA has gradually narrowed its SEP policies,
which will deter EJ advocates from pursuing SEPs.16 1 A strict nexus
requirement has greatly diminished the opportunities for SEPs to be
used to advance EJ issues.162 Additionally, the EPA has adopted a
penalty mitigation scheme creating a financial disincentive that
effectively penalizes polluters for engaging in SEPs.163 With these
challenges in mind, the EPA should revert back to its 1991 policy,' 64
which allowed a more generous mitigation policy, and a more relaxed
nexus requirement. This would entice more polluters to participate in
SEPs, and to direct the penalties to community projects that may be
only tangentially related to their environmental violations. Unlike
simple injunctive relief, a properly implemented SEP could actually
further EJ goals by making vulnerable communities better off than
they were before the violation.
158. See supra notes 116-126 and accompanying text.
159. Compare Quan B. Nghiem, Using Equitable Discretion to Impose SEPs under the
CWA, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 561, 588 (1997) (claiming that "while the intentions of
[these] courts may have been admirable, the conclusions they reached were weakened by the
fact that the judges diverted the defendants' payments towards mitigation projects despite
conceding that such payments constituted civil penalties."), with Lloyd, supra note 69, at 421
(suggesting that these deviating decisions indicate that "the letter or the rationale of
Miscellaneous Receipts Act to environmental enforcement cases has not proved successful."),
and Thagard, supra note 78, at 518 (claiming that the notion that all civil penalties must be
paid to the Treasury is an ill-founded artifact of over-reliance on 1972 legislative history, and
relied on mere dictum from Supreme Court cases.").
160. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
161. See supra Section III.C.I.
162. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text.
